Shostakovich Symphony No. 5

 

The theme of my symphony is the making of a man. I saw Man with all his experiences in the center of the composition, which is lyrical in form from beginning to end. The finale is the optimistic solution of the tragically tense moments of the first movement. 

 Shostakovich on Symphony No. 5

Background:

Dmitri Shostakovich's Symphony No. 5 is a masterpiece. The symphony was premiered in 1937. This period was the peak of soviet censorship instigated by the USSR regime.
 Pravda condemned his opera "Lady Macbeth of the Mitsenk District" as unpatriotic and dissonant and heaped ferocious attacks on the composer, simply calling it "Muddle, not Music!" on the front page review. Overnight he was marginalized by authorities who were in charge of aesthetic idealism. The fifth symphony was conceived under these insecure circumstances. Fifth is the result of fear and trembling for his very survival and avoiding the doomed fate of exile to concentration camps. The pressure combined with Shostakovich's character led to a cryptic score which on one hand should show his ideological rehabilitation in the eyes of party-approved ultranationalist style. On the other hand, he needed to satisfy his own artistic. Therefore, he opted for a Beethoven model for this symphony: Starting boldly as a sonata.

First movement: Moderato

The first movement starts with a sonata in the vein of Beethoven's tradition but this time in a hesitant and uncertain mood. By the third bar, the music undergoes a stylistically radical shift: an abrupt break-off and a downward wiggle toward a dead-end with a triple note repetition. This sequence of apprehensive start, retraction, and dead-end is repeated throughout the symphony.
The next theme is an E♭ minor folk-driven with a slight variation implemented. This simple change is the masterstroke of thematic change via slight subtle twists. This sort of subtle manipulation is characteristic of Shostakovoch's works. 
The middle section of the first movement shows a drastic change in instrumentation, with piano and bases lurching in with the dead-end theme then winds, brass, and percussion. This generates a militaristic vibe similar to parts of Overture 1812 by Tchaikovsky. Then you hear the pile-up of various tunes as they eventually fade into the strong dominant dead-end tune played by brass and percussion. Then hushly all the tunes return and the opening tune repeats with trumpet and tympani, as a premonition of what is to come in the next movements. 

Second movement: Allegretto

This epitomizes the composer's wry sense of humor pointing at his critics. It is a scherzo with a goofy vibe, a spoof on waltzes. The movement is also a hommage to Gustav Mahler (one of Shostakcich's favorites) with solos played by the first violin and flute or clarinet generating the dance imagery accompanying it.

Third movement: Largo

To the dislike of the purge-era Soviet regime, this melancholic movement struck a chord with a casual listener, conjuring the sensations of despair and longing. The third movement is a mourning for those who died, Stalin's victims. References to the Russian Orthodox liturgy are also noticeable. Here the strings are played in a way that resembles a choir. Shostakovich did this by dividing the strings into different sections. Then we have the oboe accompanied faintly by strings which is probably the saddest tune in the whole symphony. Then double basses lurch in, accompanied by strings leading to the dead-end notes again. The movement closes on a high note, with a ghostly vibe played by harp, piano, and strings. 

Fourth movement: Allegro non troppo

Starts with many march-like themes, slowly gaining pace as the movement progresses. This parade-like vibe broadly resembles Mahler's tradition (again!) in composing finales. As one expects, the symphony needed an upbeat and cheerful ending. At first glance, this seems to be a forced prosaic ending for an otherwise masterfully written symphony. But the master is at work again conjuring up layers of subtle textures. A slow march pays homage to the opera Boris Gudonov where masses praise the tsar. However, this one is bleak and a slow march. In the more upbeat part, Shostakovich deliberately altered a note again and completely changed the mood of the music. This time an alteration from B natural to B ♭ does the magic! It may look bizarre in the context of happy-ending tunes, but this is deliberately executed by the composer. The whole new minor tone foreshadows the preceding upbeat part of the movement. 

My take:

Shostakovich's Fifth Symphony is a prime example of artistic resilliance and defiance in the face of calamity and censorship. Where individuality had to be sacrificed in the name of patriotic nationalist aesthetic. Shostakovich to me epitomizes working under impossible conditions and having the cutting-edge prowess to please both sides: he includes the cosmetics to satisfy the harsh criteria of an oppressive regime, Meanwhile, he manages to insert the subtle elements to keep the music authentic. The fifth symphony fakes glory and buys him some time to breathe with standard glorious movements placed in it. But the music hints at a tragic underlying story with multiple tunes and tricks inserted masterfully in it.

Socially conscious artists reflect on society and its afflictions. They give tongue to those who were silent or were made silent. They picture an era for those who could not witness or closed their eyes on it. Similarly, Shostakovich's music mirrors his era; living under constant threats and brave masks that people were forced to wear. We are lucky that a genius lived and dared to work under immense pressure and duress. He worked and left a body of work which are quite diverse and influenced by various inspirations. From his chamber music, trios, and string quartets to symphonies to his experiments with jazz music following his trip to the US, this massive body of work shares one characteristic of social awareness. Symphony number five is an emotionally charged and complex masterpiece with hidden layers of meaning.

Snow Cold Visions

Here I am, in saturated white,

Carrying my burden of life

Through the crimson streetlights,

An entity rarely seen

Or noticed.

Lyrics: Station Dysthymia

Station Dysthymia

By chance, I met this band with an intriguing name "Station Dysthymia". They're good, i mean really good! A delightful surprise in these days of stagnation. The music is very intellectual, genuine and emotional. They've put some of the tracks for free download. Hailing from cold Siberia: "Station Dysthyima"! 
(Courtesy of Darkport.org)

A Warning Shot For Putin

Russia's parliamentary election last Sunday saw Prime Minister Vladimir Putin's party, United Russia, receive slightly less than 50 percent of the popular vote. In most countries, this would be viewed as a stunning victory. Instead, it is being interpreted by the Russian and Western press as a rebuke by a restive Russian public to Putin and his policies.
Although the electoral results are undoubtedly a signal to Putin and his political protégé, President Dmitry Medvedev, that Russian voters will not blindly follow wherever the Kremlin leads, in reality they do not portend seismographic shifts in the Russian political landscape.
Some reports, including that of The New York Times earlier this week, have argued that with only 238 seats in the 450-seat Duma, as opposed to the 315 parliamentary seats it previously held, United Russia will now be unable to change the Russian constitution unilaterally. True enough -- but what they fail to mention is that the Kremlin has little need to make any significant constitutional changes in the foreseeable future. The constitution is already stacked in favor of the presidency, and even with a reduced number of seats in parliament for United Russia, the Duma will still be compliant, since no new parties have gained seats.
The Duma is already relatively powerless compared to what Russia watchers call the "super" presidency enshrined in the 1993 constitution that was hastily written by Putin's predecessor, Boris Yeltsin, Russia's first elected president. Between the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and 1993, Yeltsin faced a recalcitrant parliament (then called the Congress of People's Deputies), whose members resisted his attempts to reform the country's troubled economy. The standoff reached its climax in the fall of 1993, when Yeltsin disbanded parliament. When Russian deputies trapped inside the parliament building broke out and attempted to take control of a national television station, Yeltsin ordered tanks to fire on the building, putting an end to the showdown.
The constitution that Yeltsin then forced through by popular referendum in December 1993 resolved the issue of legislative executive power in no uncertain terms. It allows the president to rule by decree in almost every area but the budget. At the same time, the president has the authority to disband the Duma and call new elections should parliament refuse three times to accept the president's choice of prime minister, and the executive branch has full control of the country's security and defense ministries.
The ruling tandem of Putin and Medvedev has made further constitutional changes to strengthen the executive's hand. In the constitution's original version, the president could serve a maximum of two consecutive four-year terms. In his first year as president, Medvedev changed the constitution, then approved by the United Russia-dominated Duma and the compliant Federation Council (Russia's appointed upper house of parliament), to allow for two consecutive six-year terms, paving the way for Putin to serve for a total of 12 years when he retakes the presidency (as he intends to do in the upcoming March 2012 presidential elections).
What is more, even if Putin and his allies decided they needed to change the constitution (and this is doubtful), they would still have little difficulty doing so. Sunday's election results, however dispiriting for United Russia, will not bring about any significant change to the composition of the Duma. The Communist Party (which finished second with just under 20 percent of the vote, translating into 92 seats in the Duma), the Just Russia party (13 percent and 62 seats), and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (11.7 percent and about 56 seats), are exactly the same parties that have sat in the pliant Russian Duma of the past four years.
Of the three, the Communist Party has taken the most oppositional positions toward United Russia -- at least relatively speaking -- but it has seldom voted against United Russia on legislation that actually mattered. It provided modest opposition on cuts to subsidized transportation fares for pensioners, for example, but strongly supported the invasion of Georgia in 2008.
Meanwhile, the Liberal Democratic Party, which was created by the Kremlin in the 1990s, has not provided any true opposition in the last ten years. Its outspoken and flamboyant leader, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, is more concerned with attracting attention and outrage for his appearances on television than in having any substantive debate with Putin and those close to him.
Finally, although Just Russia did manage to increase its representation in the Duma over its 2007 standing, it, too, is a Kremlin construct. (The party was originally conceived as a social democratic alternative to United Russia, but one that would still vote with the ruling party on big issues.) Historically, it provided little opposition to United Russia and is unlikely to do so now.
In effect, the opposition parties that gained seats are no real opposition at all. Any true opposition forces were weeded out far in advance of Sunday's elections. Only seven political parties met the state's strict registration requirements; the courts simply did not permit other parties that represent more independent liberal alternatives to register. The leadership of some of these groups -- in particular, Boris Nemtsov of Solidarity -- are now leading street protests in Moscow and St. Petersburg. They have little nationwide support, however, and given the degree of state control over the media, their brave efforts this week will not bring about a popular revolution.
In the end, the biggest loser on Sunday was neither United Russia nor Putin, but rather his fall guy, Medvedev. At United Russia's party congress on September 24, Medvedev nominated Putin to take over again as president. Accepting the nomination in a well-choreographed exchange, Putin then nominated Medvedev to become his prime minister should he win the presidency next March. This "castling" of positions is evidently the straw that broke the back of many Russians' tolerance for Putin's growing autocracy. Medvedev, now the party's nominee for prime minister, was the only name that appeared on the United Russia electoral list in the Duma elections. The Kremlin's apparent logic was that Medvedev's personal popularity would carry the party to easy victory.
Given the effects within Russia of the global economic downturn, a decline in the fortunes of the ruling party was inevitable, at least relative to United Russia's high in 2007, when it captured 62 percent of the vote. But few predicted that the party would receive less than 50 percent of the vote; as of late last week, reputable Russian polling agencies were predicting that it would receive at least 53 to 55 percent. The fact that United Russia supporters resorted to ballot stuffing and other falsifications to boost their votes and still fell below 50 percent will likely affect Medvedev's political prospects the most, given that he headed the party's ticket. In a foreshadowing of exactly such a scenario, Putin late last week amended his offer of the office of prime minister to Medvedev, suggesting the post might be contingent on United Russia's performance in the Duma elections. Medvedev is now particularly vulnerable.
Despite the clear falsification of electoral results, international expressions of displeasure with the electoral process, public demonstrations in Moscow and St. Petersburg calling for "Russia without Putin," the new Duma will most likely be seated by the end of the month. Putin's largely successful efforts to control the country's media and curb freedom of expression and assembly eviscerated any meaningful opposition years ago. Further, Putin remains personally popular, still polling at slightly below 70 percent approval. And if the need for muscle arises, Putin has already shown willingness to use the security forces to put down any opposition activity; he is also adept at mobilizing the country's state-controlled media and government-created youth groups to counter protests.
Still, although there will be no immediate seismic shift in the balance of power in Russia today, the masses have fired a warning shot at Putin's presidential bid. Protests against the election may be relatively small and are unlikely to lead to a Ukrainian-style popular revolt, but should Putin and Medvedev not appear to listen to voters and be ready to make a few concessions, they may have to resort to the sporadic use of force to keep the regime afloat.

by: Kathryn Stoner-Weiss

My Author of The Month (August and October 2011)

Andrei Tarkovsky

I've been reading some pieces and parts of screenplays.  I was extremely engrossed by the depth of his thought and the adamantine element of poetry entwined with philosophy.

My Author of The Month (June 2011)

How i feel his vigorous presence in my life

The Katyn Wood Massacre



The first news of a massacre at Katyn Wood came in April 1943 when the Germans found a mass grave of 4,500 Polish soldiers in German-occupied Russia. The discovery at Katyn Wood was to greatly embarrass the Russian government.
The Russians responded to the German claims that Russia's secret police did it, by claiming that the massacre was carried out by the Germans themselves. In the context of the war - the Allies were fighting the Nazi war machine and Russia was a valued ally - the German version was not accepted by the British or other Allied governments. However, in the era of the Cold War, the Russian version was heavily scrutinised and questionned.
The first announcement of what had been found at Katyn Wood was made on Radio Berlin on April 13th, 1943.

"A report has reached us from Smolensk to the effect that the local inhabitants have mentioned to the German authorities the existence of a place where mass executions have been carried out by the Bolsheviks and where 10,000 Polish officers have been murdered by the Soviet Secret State Police. The German authorities went to a place called the Hill of Goats, a Russian health resort situated twelve kilometers west of Smolensk, where a gruesome discovery was made." Radio Berlin broadcast

The Germans claimed that they found a ditch 28 meters long and 16 meters wide at the Hill of Goats in which were 3,000 bodies piled up in layers of twelve. All the bodies were fully dressed in military uniform; some were bound and all had pistol shots to the back of their heads. The Germans believed that they would find 10,000 bodies (hence the figure in the broadcast) but eventually the final total was 4,500.
The Germans claimed that the bodies were in good condition and they even recognised a general Smorawinsky as one of the victims. The soil had done a great deal to preserve the bodies and any documentation found on them.
However, any information relating to this massacre made public during the war came from Goebbel's propaganda ministry and had to be treated as suspect by the Allies. In January 1943, the Russians had turned the tide of the war with the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad - a victory Churchill had urged all on the Allied side to celebrate. As if in a knee-jerk reaction, any criticism about the Russians in Easter 1943 would not have been acceptable. Any connection between the massacre and the Germans, however, would have been more readily accepted by all those fighting against the Nazis.
But what exactly did happen at Katyn Wood?
When German forces attacked Poland in September 1939, the Blitzkrieg tactic tore great holes in the Polish defence. However, on September 17th, as part of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, Russian forces also invaded Poland. The Russian leadership called on the Polish soldiers to rise up against their officers and political leaders as a punishment for getting the country into an unjust war. Those Polish officers and senior NCO's captured by the Red Army were arrested and deported to Russia.
It is known that they were taken to three camps in Russia - Kozelsk, Starobelsk and Ostashkov. One of the camps, Kozelsk, contained more than just officers. It contained arrested Polish university lecturers, surgeons, physicians, barristers and lawyers. One woman prisoner was held at Kozelsk - Janina Lewandowski. Her body was found at Katyn clothed in the uniform of the Polish Air Force. Ostashkov held officers - but it also held anybody from Poland who was considered to be 'bourgeois'. It seems that only Starobelsk held only officers from the Polish military.
To start with, the Russians attempted to 're-educate' the Poles in all three camps. Brigadier Zarubin of the Soviet Secret State Police was put in charge of this task. His efforts to promote the Soviet way of life probably had no chance. The Poles in the camp were forbidden to say Mass - which for a devout Roman Catholic nation was a major blow and it was almost certainly done secretly. Therefore, it is untenable to think that there were any takers for the Soviet view point which Zarubin was trying to sell. It seems that Zarubin reported his failure to Moscow and shortly after this a colonel from the Soviet Secret State Police turned up at all three camps. Just after the visit of this colonel, groups of prisoners were taken from the camps to an unknown destination.
In April 1940, all three camps were simultaneously cleared.
On June 22nd, 1941, Nazi Germany launched 'Operation Barbarossa'. The German military swept aside the Russian army and penetrated deep into Russia. Stalin, alarmed by the collapse of the Red Army, ordered that an amnesty should be granted to all Polish prisoners who were willing to fight against the Germans. On August 14th 1941, a Polish-Soviet military agreement was signed. However, no-one could account for the whereabouts of the officers held in Kozelsk, Starobelsk and Ostashkov. Winston Churchill himself wrote about the embarrassment such a disclosure brought on the Russian authorities.
The Polish government in exile, based in London, was especially concerned that the Russians explain where these men were. Stalin gave two answers. Initially, he claimed that the men had escaped to Manchuria. However, the authorities in Moscow - which was effectively Stalin - claimed that the men were held in territory that the Germans had taken in their lightning attack in June 1941 and that only the Germans could account for their whereabouts. This was to become the standard Moscow answer to the problem - the Germans were responsible.
Locals at Katyn Forest had long known that it was an area used by the secret police to execute those who had fallen out with Stalin's government. As early as 1929, the Soviet secret police had built a dacha there surrounded by barbed wire and armed guards. To keep out the locals, the secret police also used guard dogs to patrol the perimeter of the dacha.
On July 16th, 1941, Smolensk fell to the Germans. The Russian authorities had fled from Katyn and for the first time in years, the area was open 'to the public'. In 1942, Poles from the Todt Organisation arrived in the area to collect any form of scrap. As they worked on the Hill of Goats, they found the body of a dead Polish officer who was later buried in a dignified service. However, the winter for 1942-43 was severe and the ground at the Hill of Goats was frozen over.
In the Spring of 1943, a Russian peasant, Ivan Krivozertzev, read an article in a newspaper ('Novyj Put') regarding General Sikorski and his search for thousands of Polish officers whom he could not account for. Despite communism in Russia, Krivozertzev had maintained his religious beliefs and re-called what he had seen in Smolensk in 1940.
He had seen rail wagons coming into Smolensk station but being shunted into screened sidings. He had seen men being herded under armed guard into 'Black Ravens' - the local nickname for prison vehicles. Krivozertzev had also seen 'normal' prisoners being driven from Smolensk city in lorries with shovels and pick axes. Krivozertzev went to the Germans and told them that he believed the Polish officers would be found at the Hill of Goats. The Germans went to the forest and dug up mounds that had young fir trees on the top of them. These trees gave away an obvious secret as the rings on them indicated that they had been planted in April 1940.
The Germans started digging in the Hill of Goats and found the bodies of many men, still in military uniform, who had been shot in the back of the head with their hands tied behind their backs. The Germans also found the bodies of Russian men and women who had been shot long before 1940. Curiously, the Germans claimed that the way the Russians and Poles had been tied was identical and that whoever did both sets of murders was the same organisation. The 4,500 bodies that were exhumed came from Kozelsk - no-one knows what happened to the men held at Starobelsk and Ostashkov. Moscow announced its stance on April 14th 1943:

"The Polish prisoners in question were interned in the vicinity of Smolensk in special camps and were employed in road construction. In was impossible to evacuate them at the time of the approach of the German troops and, as a result, they fell into their hands. If, therefore, they have been found murdered, it means that they have been murdered by the Germans who, for reasons of provocation, now claim that the crime was committed by Soviet authorities."

On April 15th, the British government publically stated via the BBC that the Germans had told lies and that it accepted the Russian version. This caused the Polish government in exile to call for an independent inspection of Katyn - something the International Red Cross in Switzerland could do. The German and Polish government (in exile) agreed to this; Moscow did not. The Russians broke off all relations with Poland and set up a puppet Polish government in Moscow.
When Russia advanced into Europe and re-captured Katyn, it seemed as if the issue was solved as it was clear that the Russians were not going to allow any investigation into what happened at Katyn. At the Nuremburg trials, the murders were linked to the indictment against Goering and the Russians presented their evidence to 'prove' it was the Germans, but they were never probed and Katyn drifted into obscurity. At the final judgment of the International Tribunal, Katyn was not even mentioned.
For their part the Russians claimed that the massacre took place after it became obvious that the Wehrmacht was in full retreat after their defeat at Stalingrad and that it was carried out by the Nazis. They put up the following evidence gathered at Nuremburg:
The Germans did not allow any external authority to fully examine either the bodies or the grave sites. The Polish Commission, set up by the Nazis to examine the evidence, was only allowed to see what the Germans wanted them to see. One Bulgarian professor, Marko Markov, claimed that he was only allowed to dissect one body that was presented to him and that he could not conclude from this body that it had been in the ground for three years – as the Nazis tried to suggest to him that it had been. In his written report, Markov only wrote about what he found on the body – he did not give a conclusion as to how the body got into its state.
He and seven other experts were only allowed two half-a-day visits to the grave sites by the Germans. “It reminded me of a tourist trip”, claimed Markov.
The Russians also claimed that the issue of the three year old saplings was also easy to explain. They claimed that there was no evidence that they came from the grave mounds themselves and that they could have been gathered at any point from Katyn Wood and handed in as ‘evidence’.
The Russians also claimed that all the bullets found on the bodies were made by the German firm Geko. It was claimed that they were all Geko 7.65 mm bullets which only the German would have had access to.
Who committed the murders remained a mystery until 1990 when the Russian authorities admitted that it was the Russian Secret police (NKVD), that then spent much time and effort in attaching blame on the Germans.
@historylearningsite.co.uk
Pic : General Mieczyslaw Smorawinski

My Author Of the Month (March)

My Author of The Month (February)

Oil Tycoon Convicted of Embezzlement Again !

A judge in Moscow on Monday handed down a new conviction against Mikhail B. Khodorkovsky, the former oil tycoon, in a case that has been widely seen as an indicator of the Kremlin’s tolerance for political dissent. Mr. Khodorkovsky, who has already been imprisoned for seven years after feuding with Vladimir V. Putin, was found guilty on embezzlement charges that could keep him behind bars for several more years. Formerly Russia’s richest man, Mr. Khodorkovsky, 47, is the country’s most well-known prisoner, and his treatment has been held up by opponents of the Kremlin as evidence that the justice system here is readily manipulated by those in power.
The judge did not immediately pass sentence, and it was unclear when he might do so. While a guilty verdict was expected, the length of the sentence will be scrutinized as a sign of whether the Kremlin wants to loosen or tighten control over the political system.
Mr. Putin, the former president and current prime minister, has often assailed Mr. Khodorkovsky as a criminal who ordered his associates to kill people so that he could amass wealth. Just this month, Mr. Putin referred to Mr. Khodorkovsky as a thief who should “sit in jail” — criticism that Mr. Khodorkovsky’s lawyers described as a blatant attempt to pressure the court.
A short prison sentence might be considered a victory for Mr. Putin’s protégé, President Dmitri A. Medvedev, a former law professor who is thought of as less of a hard-liner. Mr. Medvedev has been promoting policies to modernize Russia, and analysts say the Khodorkovsky case is an obstacle toward convincing foreign investors that the country’s legal system is fair.
Mr. Khodorkovsky’s co-defendant and business associate, Platon L. Lebedev, was also found guilty on Monday by the judge, Viktor Danilkin.Mr. Khodorkovsky earned his fortune in the rough-and-tumble 1990’s after the fall of Communism, snapping up state-owned oil fields at a fraction of their worth and then creating one of the world’s largest oil companies. Like many Russian businessmen at the time, he had a reputation for engaging in practices that would be illegal or unsavory in the West.
He later decided to reform both his image and his business, and became a champion, at least publicly, of good corporate governance. He also delved into politics, which is where he seems to have run into trouble.
After Mr. Putin became president in 2000, he made clear to the class of tycoons who earned their fortunes in the 1990’s that they could keep their holdings if they did not interfere with the Kremlin.
Mr. Khodorkovsky apparently did not heed the message. He financed political parties and ignored increasingly pointed warnings from Mr. Putin’s associates. In 2003, Mr. Khodorkovsky was arrested on the tarmac of an airport in Siberia. He has been in prison since then.
He was convicted of tax fraud in 2005, and his companies were essentially confiscated by the government.
His current sentence ends in 2011, which is just before Russia’s next presidential election. Analysts suggested that Mr. Putin did not want Mr. Khodorkovsky out of prison before then, which is why prosecutors brought fresh charges against him.
In the current case, he was accused of stealing $27 billion in oil from subsidiaries of his own oil conglomerate through pricing schemes. Mr. Khodorkovsky’s lawyers call the charges absurd, and politically motivated.

@nytimes.com

Old-School Code of Trust Ruined

Here's an article by John Hughes,former editor of The Christian Science Monitor/Pedram

The WikiLeaks dump of US embassy cables last month was a reckless act. It is a far cry from the responsible reporting on foreign affairs with which I am familiar.When I was the State Department spokesman in the Reagan administration, Bernard Kalb, then diplomatic correspondent for NBC, called me about a tip that the bad guys in Beirut, Lebanon, had captured and were holding an American CIA officer.


“Bernie,” I said, “I’ll only talk off the record about that.”
“No way,” Bernie replied, “If it’s off the record I can’t use it.”
“Well, that’s the deal,” I said. “See what your network says.”

The network agreed to the deal. I told Bernie that the officer being held was the CIA station chief in Beirut. We didn’t know whether the captors knew of his CIA association. If Bernie went with the story, the officer would certainly be killed. Honorably, the network did not run the story. Sadly, the captors tortured the officer, discovered his identity, and killed him.
The importance of relationships:
That was a classic example of trust between a diplomatic correspondent and a government official. It is the kind of relationship observed regularly between State Department officials in Washington and US diplomatic correspondents.
Sometimes the journalist is checking out a questionable rumor. Sometimes the diplomat is offering background on a situation that for good reasons cannot then, or ever, be made public. For example: Dissidents given secret sanctuary in a US embassy; a foreign diplomat barred from travel because he is actually a high-ranking intelligence officer recruiting American nuclear scientists; US diplomats caught outside the US Embassy in Tehran when it was seized by extremists, but hidden safely for months by diplomats of other countries.
Exchanges and agreements between responsible journalists and senior diplomats go on each day with clear understanding about what can, or should, be published.

The consequences:

Many of the cables revealed by WikiLeaks are of little consequence. In many respects the dispatches to Washington of US diplomats abroad echo the work of foreign correspondents. They report on formal discussions with foreign leaders, then attempt interpretations of what the motives and intentions of foreign governments may really be.
The peccadillos and peculiarities of a foreign head of state may be useful to chronicle.

One cable referred to Russia’s prime minister, Vladimir Putin, and its president, Dmitry Medvedev, as Batman and Robin. Mr. Putin was not amused. But Russia is hardly likely to sever diplomatic relations. Another embassy cable lauded French President Nicolas Sarkozy as a sturdy friend of America, but also called him “mercurial.” Half a dozen French columnists might have written the same thing.
As one of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s foreign counterparts told her: “You should see what we say about you.”
Disclosure of US moves to remove a Pakistani stockpile of highly enriched uranium is much more significant. Working to keep such material from hostile hands may have been immensely important. Revealing it may jeopardize that effort.

Similarly, reports that Arab leaders privately urged the United States to take out Iran’s nuclear weapons capacity can hardly have resonated well in their capitals. During my stint in government I sat through many meetings in foreign capitals with heads of state who blasted rivals and other governments but who in public proclaimed lasting friendship with the same characters and entities.
Trusted diplomatic correspondents know how to garner information and inject their dispatches with depth and detail without embarrassing sources that must be protected.
WikiLeaks’s indiscriminate dumping of tens of thousands of purloined classified documents into the public domain for friend and foe to read is neither responsible journalism nor does it strike a blow for transparency. It is the work of a politically motivated activist intent on doing America harm.


John Hughes, a former editor of the Monitor, writes a biweekly column.

الگوی روسی

کماکان با مجله ی مهرنامه مهر ماه  مشغول هستم و باید بگویم که مجله ی ارزشمندیست و در حوزه ی علوم انسانی کاربسیاردرخشانی محسوب می شود.در بخش فلسفه ی ساسی در پنجمین شماره مهرنامه گفتگویی با خسرو ناقد درباره ی دیدگاه های پوپر انجام شده است. ..بسیار خواندنیست:          پدرام

جامعه ی باز تنها اقتصاد بازار آزاد نیست ، بلکه با حقوق مدنی شهروندان و نیز با دولت مبتنی بر قانون که طرفدار اصلاحات  اجتماعی است، پیوندی تنگاتنگ دارد . به نظر پوپر تنها وجود قوانین کافی نیست تا جامعه ای را "جامعه ی باز " بنامیم.

برپایی دولتی مبتنی برقانون که پایبند به چنین قوانینی باشد، از تدوین خود قوانین مهم تر و دشوارتر استف و از آن دشوارتر تحقق نظم حقوقی در سطح کشور است.این توصیه پوپر به خصوص برای روسیه و برخی کشورهای اروپای شرقی که صورتی زشت از سرمایه داری بی ریشه وبی هویت و افسار گسیخته در آنها در حال رشداست و فساد و دیوان سالاری نظام گذشته کمابیش بازتولید می شود و آزادی به معنای آزادی مافیای اقتصادی وصاحبان قدرت است،از اهمیت ویژه ای برخوردار است.

My Turn To Philosophy

It's so important to make a sentimental flashback to my educational and scholar outfits since 2000.Extracurricular studies have always been a major interest for me.definitely it started before high school period but jelled up in history and philosophy of art in 1998-1999.I can clearly remember joyful experience of reading lives of Modigliani and Georgio de Cherico.During 2000-2001 all positive aspect faded as a futile activity.The sole study was related to Old Religious Left leader in iran Dr Ali Shariati.The text a collection of ideas about Dr Shariati's life .The most inspirational section was published letters between Shariati and Allameh Shikh Mohammad Taghi Shoushtari,where Shariati asked about interpretation of a prayer.This open hermeneutical approach to a solid text had a tremendous impact.Frustration and Burn out claws extended to my routine activities and lead to a big lenghty pause in my academic and extracurricular pace.The second movement was lead by Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling" which i read in March 2006,word by word by my heart.The huge impact of danish philosopher was highly related to synchronized events in my personal life.The soothing enlightment of philosophy warmed the heart in those disappointing period. It's definite that depth i found in pure philosophy text was an essential factor which attracted me .Now i was back to an obsessive extracurricular study timeouts.It apparently harmed my marks and grades in universty,but i really couldn't stop myself . I felt i needed to establish a systematic thinking,i needed an ideologic backbone to lean on in my hard days,to conjure up harmony in my scattered activities.I knew it will cost me a spine-chilling lengthy era but it was an inevitable step forward.
Now Philosophy is the most interesting subject for my spare time .I attend a more peaceful period in terms of organizing my mind.I discuss better,deduce better and most importantly i've opened guard toward new words and idea which is the most valuable achievement . I receive people and ideas better. 
My third wave of my studies has been  mainly focused on ideas  Arthur Schopenhauer . I also have exciting plan to re-read Dostoyevsky's early works in my spare times.Dostoyevski has had a profound influence on my ordeal type moments.

Movies added to my Archive

Unfortunately i've lost some of my prolific connections (to whom i referred for movies) guys used to be my friends and they have dazzling knowledge about their business.

The acessable options are really hard to deal with;they don't understand any thing but the green language! But that was the only way and i was in the real need.

so on wednesday after 2 days of checking the list (and i have to say their archive didnt cover many of my priorities) i selected these six movies and ordered them:

1-Awakenings---Penny Marshall 1990

2-Andrei Rublyov---Andrei Tarkovsky 1966

3-The Basketball Diaries---Scott Kalvert 1996

4-One Flew Over the Cuckoo's Nest---Milos Forman 1975

5-The Nightmare Before Christmas---Tim Burton/Henry Selick 1994

6-Red-Beard(Akahige)---Akira Kurosawa 1965

>>>these movies still remain in my Thank-List:

1-The Invention of Lying---Ricky Gravis/Matthew Robinson 2009

2-The Panic in Needle Park---Jerry Scalzberg 1971

3-Code Unknown---Michael Haneke 2000

4-Process de Jeanne D'aRc---Robert Bresson 1962

5-The WAges of Fear(Le salaire de la peur)---Henry-Georges Clouzot 1953

6-Mother and Son(Mat i Syn)---Aleksandr Sokurov 1999